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INTRODUCTION
For almost ten years, the patent community has been struggling
under a system where the central law of each case-the interpretation
of the patent claims-is reversed by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in approximately forty percent of cases.1 The effect of
this high reversal rate is that the district court trial-which should be
the focal point of the litigation process-has been relegated to being
little more than an expensive audition on the road to the appellate
court 2-where the parties learn post hoc what the law of the case
should have been.
The high reversal rate is due at least in part to the Federal
Circuit's rulings in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman
I)' and Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,4 which both held that
patent claim construction is a pure question of law with no underlying
factual inquiries. Classifying claim construction as a purely legal
question, Markman I and Cybor freed the district courts from having
to submit any underlying factual question to the jury prior to claim
interpretation.5
These decisions held three promises. First, by eliminating lay
jury input from often complex patent claim interpretation, Markman6
promised to promote more accurate and consistent trial court
decisions.7 Second, by eliminating any need for jury factfinding
during claim interpretation, Markman freed the district courts to
quickly provide a definitive interpretation of the claims in a
specialized pre-trial "Markman hearing."8  Because claim
interpretation is typically outcome-determinative, the patent
community hoped that Markman's expedited claim constructions
1. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (Rader, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 1477 ("Instead the trial court becomes a ticket to the real center stage, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.").
3. 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
4. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1451.
5. See discussion infra Part ll.B.
6. Throughout this Comment, the Federal Circuit Markman decision will be referred
to as "Markman I' and the United States Supreme Court Markman decision, affirming the
removal of the jury from the claim construction process, will be referred to as "Markman
II." Collectively, the two decisions will be referred to as "Markman." See Part II.B for a
discussion of these decisions.
7. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 388
(1996) (noting that "judges, not juries are better suited to find the acquired meaning of
patent terms"); Markman 1, 52 F.3d at 981 (noting that allowing judges and not juries to
interpret patents would lend stability and predictability to patent litigation); see also
discussion infra Part II.B.
8. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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would promote early settlement of most disputes.9 Finally, by
denying that claim construction involves any substantial factual
inquiries, Markman and Cybor also promised more accurate decisions
by allowing de novo review by expert patent judges in the Federal
Circuit."°
Unfortunately, Markman and Cybor have had exactly the
opposite effect. By allowing the Federal Circuit to exercise
unfettered review of the district courts' claim constructions, these
decisions have created a substantial disincentive to early settlement."
The Federal Circuit currently reverses approximately forty percent of
all claim constructions and fifty percent of all patent cases in
general.'2 This staggering reversal rate has trivialized the trial court
proceedings and eliminated incentives to settle until after the
definitive claim interpretation is received, well after the trial, at the
Federal Circuit. 3
For years, many practitioners and commentators have argued
that the Federal Circuit could promote efficiency and certainty in
patent litigation by reining in de novo review and restoring some
degree of deference to trial court claim constructions. 4 Curtailing de
novo review would preserve the positive effect of providing early,
pre-trial claim construction without trivializing trial court
proceedings. 5 Indeed, prior to Markman, judges often granted
deference to trial courts on the factual underpinnings of claim
construction. 6 Accordingly, in Phillips v. AWH Corp.," the Federal
Circuit asked parties to submit briefs on the possibility of scaling back
the de novo standard.18 The question elicited a strong response from
9. See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1475 (Rader J., dissenting) ("Markman I potentially
promised to supply early certainty about the meaning of a patent claim. This certainty, in
turn, would prompt early settlement of many, if not most patent suits."); see also Markman
1, 52 F.3d at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring) ("[T]o decide what the claims mean is nearly
always to decide the case.").
10. See William H. Burgess, Simplicity at the Cost of Clarity: Appellate Review of
Claim Construction and the Failed Promise of Cybor, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 763, 763 (2005)
("[B]y securing de novo review the Federal Circuit would be freer to lead by example and
could ensure consistency and uniformity in claim construction by taking the issue for
itself.").
11. See discussion infra Part III.D.2.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See discussion infra Part III.
15. See id.
16. See discussion infra Part II.A.
17. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
18. See id. at 1328 ("In our order granting rehearing en banc, we asked the parties to
brief various questions, including the following: 'Consistent with the Supreme Court's
20061 1293
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the patent community, which filed over thirty amicus briefs on the
question. 9 Despite the arguments of several prominent amici curiae
that some degree of deference would be beneficial,2 ° the Federal
Circuit, without comment, refused to revisit its holdings in Markman I
and Cybor.
21
In light of the Phillips decision, it appears that de novo review of
claim construction will be the law of the Federal Circuit for the
foreseeable future.22 The focus now becomes finding ways to work
within the current Markman-Cybor standard to restore efficiency and
predictability to patent litigation. One noninvasive solution would be
for the Federal Circuit to begin reviewing claim construction on an
interlocutory basis.2 The interlocutory appeal solution is not a novel
idea. Other commentators have previously argued that, in light of the
Federal Circuit's high reversal rate, regular interlocutory appeals
decision in Markman [II] and our en banc decision in Cybor ... is it appropriate for this
court to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court claim construction rulings? If so,
on what aspects, in what circumstances, and to what extent?' ").
19. Id. at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (noting that the possibility of restoring
deference to the district courts had "whipp[ed] the bar into a frenzy of expectation"); see
also Dennis Crouch, Defining Your Terms, PAT. WORLD, Dec. 2004/Jan. 2005, at 10, 10,
available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/dennis-crouch paper on-phillips.v.
%20AWH (reviewing the amicus briefs filed in Phillips).
20. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21-23, Phillips, 415 F.3d
1303 (No. 03-1269), available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/govt_phillips_-
brief.pdf (noting the detrimental effects of the Federal Circuit's high reversal rate and
recommending deference to the trial courts); Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property
Owners Association at 15, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (No. 03-1269), available at
http://www.ipo.orglTemplate.cfm?Section=IPOAmicusBriefs&CONTENTID=16280&
TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (advocating deference to the
trial courts when extrinsic evidence must be employed in claim construction); Brief of
Amicus Curiae International Trade Commission Trial Lawyers Association at 18-23,
Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (No. 03-1269), available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/
files/itctlaamicusbr.PDF (advocating deference to trial court factual findings); Brief for
Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither
Party at 18-23, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (No. 03-1269), available at http://patentlaw.
typepad.com/patent/files/AIPLA.pdf (advocating deference to the trial court in the factual
elements of claim construction); Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Circuit Bar Association
at 7, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (No. 03-1269), available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/
patent/files/FCBA.pdf (claim construction may require factual findings which should be
reviewed for clear error). But see Brief for Amicus Curiae The Association of the Bar of
the City of New York at 14-18, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (No. 03-1269), available at
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/new-yorkcityassociation ofthe bar.pdf
(arguing that deference to the trial court's claim construction findings is blocked by
procedural and practical obstacles).
21. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328.
22. See infra note 204.
23. See infra note 205.
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would help promote predictability and efficiency in patent litigation.24
Although their earlier work was compelling, the forcefulness of their
arguments was tempered by the possibility that the Federal Circuit
might instead implement a less drastic solution-curtailing the de
novo review standard in favor of deference to the trial courts.
However, the recent Phillips decision established that the Federal
Circuit will continue to exercise de novo review for the foreseeable
future.25 In light of Phillips, the need for interlocutory appeals has
acquired new salience and should be reconsidered as a pragmatic
means of restoring the promise of Markman.
Part I of this Comment describes the basic claim interpretation
process and the creation of the Federal Circuit. Part II traces the
contentious development of the current de novo regime in place at
the Federal Circuit. Part III evaluates the detrimental effects of de
novo review and evaluates several alternative standards of review
proposed by the various Federal Circuit judges. Part IV argues that,
in light of the Phillips court's unwillingness to rein in the de novo
standard of review, interlocutory appeals should be reexamined as a
pragmatic way to restore stability to patent litigation. Additionally,
Part V evaluates several arguments against interlocutory appeals and
other methods of implementation. This Comment concludes that the
most viable solution, in light of Phillips, is the promulgation of a
procedural rule specifically making claim construction reviewable on
an interlocutory basis.
I. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND THE CREATION OF THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT
A. The Anatomy of a Patent
In the most basic sense, a patent is a governmental grant to an
inventor of the exclusive right to make, use, or sell her invention.26
Typically a patent begins with a brief summary of the invention (the
24. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve
Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 37 (2001) (providing a statistical analysis of the
Federal Circuit's reversal rates and arguing that the Federal Circuit should grant
interlocutory review of claim construction decisions); Craig Allen Nard, Process
Considerations in the Age of Markman and Mantras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 357
(arguing in favor of a discretionary procedural rule making claim construction decisions
subject to discretionary interlocutory appeal).
25. See infra note 204.
26. Greg J. Michelson, Note, Did the Markman Court Ignore Fact, Substance, and the
Spirit of the Constitution in Its Rush Toward Uniformity?, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV 1707, 1709
(1997) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994)).
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abstract) and any technical drawings. The inventor then must include
a "specification section" that. includes a description of the prior
innovations in the field and a "written description [of the invention]
... in such full, clear, and exact terms ... , as to enable any person
skilled in the art or science, [of which it is a branch] ... to make ...
and use the same. '27 As the specification section typically contains a
broader description of the technology than what the inventor's
innovation encompasses, since 1836 Congress has required that the
inventor explicitly designate the "part, improvement, or combination
which he claims as his own. '28 These "claims" define the "metes and
bounds" of the claimed invention just as a deed sets forth real
property boundaries. 29 Because the claims define the precise scope of
patent protection, they are of vital importance in any patent
litigation.0
B. The Patent Interpretation Process
Because the patent claims define the scope of patent protection,
the first step of patent infringement analysis is to interpret the
meaning of the claims that have allegedly been infringed.31 "Like the
interpretation of a statute or a contract, claim construction is the
process by which a court determines the meaning of the ... patent
claim[s] for the purposes of the litigation."32 The court's goal in claim
construction is not to "rewrite the claims, [but rather] to give effect to
the terms chosen by the patentee."33 Claim construction is almost
always the most important phase of any patent litigation, as one
27. The Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 199 (repealed 1870); see also Dave
A. Ghatt & Timothy B. Kang, Claim Interpretation: A Regression to Uncertain Times, 84
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 456, 458 (2002) (summarizing the origins of the patent
claim requirement).
28. The Patent Act of 1836, § 6; cf. 35 U.S.C. § 112(2) (2000) (requiring that the
patent claims "particularly point[ ] out and distinctly[ ] claim the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention"); see also Ghatt & Kang, supra note 27, at 458
(summarizing the origins of the patent claim requirement).
29. In re Vamco Mach. & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also
Smith Int'l Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1579 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 996 (1983) (explaining that the patent claims typically follow the specification in a
distinct "claims section").
30. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation:
Administrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 109, 109 (2000) (noting that claim
interpretation is "frequently the central issue in infringement litigation"); Giles S. Rich,
Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American Perspectives, 21 INT'L REV.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990) ("The name of the game is the claim.").
31. Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
32. See Burgess, supra note 10, at 767.
33. K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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Federal Circuit judge has observed: "to decide what the claims mean
is nearly always to decide the case."34  Following the claim
construction, the parties will often settle or the court will enter
summary judgment if the accused device either clearly does or does
not infringe the patent.35 If the parties proceed through the trial, it is
the factfinder's responsibility to compare the accused device to the
court's interpretation of the patent claims and determine if the
defendant has infringed the patent.36 The jury, not the court, typically
performs this function.37
C. The Creation of the Federal Circuit
The federal courts traditionally have had exclusive jurisdiction
over patent cases. Patent cases are tried in the district courts.38 Prior
to 1982, patent appeals were handled in the various regional circuits
with each circuit developing its own patent law.39 Some district court
and appellate court judges, viewing patents as undesirable
monopolies, routinely invalidated patents or construed the claims so
narrowly that there could be no infringement.' Other judges took a
34. Markman I, 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Mayer, J., concurring),
affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); cf. William F. Lee & Anita K Krug, Still Adjusting to Markman:
A Prescription for the Timing of Claim Construction Hearings, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 55,
59 (1999) (noting that Markman was expected to result in an increased number of
summary judgments).
35. See Burgess, supra note 10, at 768 ("[When] the trial court's claim construction
either clearly does or does not encompass the infringer's device ... it becomes
unnecessary to proceed further .. .
36. Markman 1, 52 F.3d at 976.
37. Despite skepticism about the lay jury's ability to comprehend and adjudicate
patent cases, jury demands are made in seventy-eight percent of patent cases. Kimberly
A. Moore, Jury Demands: Who's Asking?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 847 (2002).
Although either plaintiff or defendant may demand a jury trial, see FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b),
the plaintiff is far more likely to make the demand. Moore, supra, at 855 tbl.1 (noting that
the plaintiff demands a jury trial in seventy-one percent of patent cases, compared with
twenty-nine percent of cases in which defendants make the request). The plaintiff is more
likely to demand a jury trial because of the widespread belief that juries are pro-patentee.
Indeed juries find for the patentee in sixty-three percent of cases, compared with only
forty-nine percent for bench trials. Id. at 874 tbl.4 (noting previous research) (citing
Kimberly A. Moore, Judge, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the Black
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 367-69 (2000)); see also ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER,
INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 124-25
(2004) (noting the increased prevalence of jury trials and the general perception that juries
have a pro-patentee bias).
38. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 37, at 98.
39. Id.
40. Simone A. Rose, Patent "Monopolyphobia": A Means of Extinguishing the
Fountainhead?, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 509,527 (1999).
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much more permissive view of patents.41  By the early 1980s, the
different regional circuits had developed disparate reputations for
being particularly favorable or unfavorable to the patentee.42 For
example, between 1953 and 1977, patents were found valid and
infringed in less than ten percent of the cases heard on appeal in the
Eighth Circuit.43 In the Tenth Circuit, this number was almost sixty
percent." Forum shopping was rampant .4  The high rates of patent
invalidation and the disparities between the regional circuits' patent
jurisprudence cheapened the value of patents and restricted both
technical innovation and economic development.'
In response to these concerns, Congress created the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 and gave it a mandate to
bring greater uniformity to patent law.47 Congress gave the Federal
41. See infra note 45.
42. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989). An apocryphal story is told of then-Second Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge Thurgood Marshall. While Judge Marshall was visiting Senators
in preparation for his Supreme Court confirmation hearing, one well-known Senator
asked him about his views on patents. The judge reportedly responded, "I haven't given
patents much thought, Senator, because I'm from the Second Circuit and as you know we
don't uphold patents in the Second Circuit." See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Side Bar: The
Creation of the Federal Circuit, in PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 30, 31 (Donald S. Chisum
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2001).
43. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 37, at 100 fig.4.1.
44. Id.
45. Dreyfuss, supra note 42, at 7. Between 1945 and 1957, "a patent was twice as
likely to be held valid and infringed in the Fifth Circuit than in the Seventh Circuit, and
almost four times more likely to be enforced in the Seventh Circuit than in the Second
Circuit." Id. "[A] request to transfer a patent infringement action from Texas, in the Fifth
Circuit, to Illinois, in the Seventh Circuit, would be bitterly fought .... " Id.
46. See Michael S. Mireles, Jr., The United States Patent Reform Quagmire: A
Balanced Proposal, 6 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 709, 724 (2005) (noting that prior to the
formation of the Federal Circuit, "[i]nventors and capitalists were unsure of whether to
invest in the research and development of a particular product or even bear the costs of
prosecuting a patent because it was unclear whether they will [sic] recoup the money
invested in creation of that product"); see also Industrial Innovation and Patent and
Copyright Law Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 6033, H.I
6934, H.R. 3806, and H.R. 2414, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 574-75 (1980) (statement of Sidney
A. Diamond, Comm'r of Patents and Trademarks); The Sixth Annual Judicial Conference
of The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 84 F.R.D. 429, 471-75 (1979)
(comments of Robert Benson).
47. H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20-23 (1981); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Mayer, J. dissenting); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs.,
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting that the Federal Circuit was
created to "provide[] national uniformity [in] the construction of patent claims");
Dreyfuss, supra note 42, at 6-7; Ninth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 94 F.R.D. 350, 359 (1982) (statement of
Representative Kastenmeier).
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Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals.4" Although the
Federal Circuit is largely regarded as a great improvement over the
earlier regional appellate system, the Federal Circuit has not lived up
to its congressional mandate in certain areas. 9
II. EVOLVING THEORIES OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION IN THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
A. The Pre-Markman Era
One area where the Federal Circuit has created, rather than
settled, controversy is in the field of claim construction. Early
Federal Circuit cases were unclear as to whether claim construction is
a legal, factual, or mixed issue." Two divergent theories of claim
construction emerged from the Federal Circuit: that claim
construction is a purely legal question and that claim construction is a
mixed question of fact and law. The former theory was expressly
endorsed in the Federal Circuit's first case reviewing claim
construction, SSIH Equipment S.A. v. United States International
Trade Commission.51 Numerous Federal Circuit cases followed the
same theory. 2 Later decisions, however, endorsed the view that
claim construction might involve preliminary factual inquiries. The
48. The Federal Circuit is "the lone appellate court in the federal system whose
jurisdiction is based on subject matter rather than geography." Burgess, supra note 10, at
766; see also Ashley B. Summer, Note, Aerojet Takes a Dive After over Twelve Years of
Flight, 54 S.C. L. REV. 1131, 1131-34 (2003) (summarizing the creation of the Federal
Circuit).
49. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?
An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1174 (2004)
(stating that, while the Federal Circuit has not been an "unqualified success," it is "moving
in the right direction"); see also Phillips v. AWH Corporation-Revisiting the Rules of
Claim Construction: Still No Magic Formula, FENWICK & WEST, LLP, July 13, 2005, at 2,
http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/publications/Litigation/Litigation-Alert_07-13-05.pdf
("Phillips is a reminder to us all that even after 200 years, the law of patents in the United
States has not yet settled on some very fundamental points.").
50. See Matthew R. Hulse, Cybor v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
87, 88 (1999).
51. 718 F.2d 365, 376 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("With respect to infringement, the question of
'what is the thing patented' is one of law, while the question 'has that thing been
constructed [made], used or sold' by the alleged infringer is a factual issue .... ); see also
Lee & Krug, supra note 34, at 62-67 (discussing the inconsistency in the Federal Circuit's
early claim construction cases).
52. See, e.g., Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc, 970 F.2d 816, 822-23 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 986 (Fed. Cir, 1988); SRI Int'l v.
Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118-22 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc);
Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1569-71 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Kalman v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760,770-71 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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first Federal Circuit case to advocate limited jury involvement in
claim construction was McGill Inc. v. John Zink Co.53 In McGill, the
Federal Circuit affirmed SSIH's central holding that claim
construction is fundamentally an issue of law, but then held that the
judge can only resolve the issue when the language of the claims is
clear and readily determinable. 4  If extrinsic evidence becomes
necessary to interpret the claim, the court held that the jury should be
allowed to determine its credibility and meaning." Therefore, McGill
is perhaps best viewed not as being in direct conflict with SSIH, but
rather as crafting a narrow exception to it-that the jury may assist
the court in evaluating extrinsic evidence of a claim's meaning.
Over the next decade, the majority of Federal Circuit decisions,
relying upon SSIH, applied de novo review to claim construction.1
6
However, a small number of cases, citing McGill, endorsed the
"extrinsic evidence" exception for jury involvement. 7 Other Federal
Circuit decisions began to go even further in allowing jury
involvement. For example, in Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-
Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H.,58 the court went so far as to
advocate jury input any time a claim is "unclear, subject to varying
interpretations, or ambiguous."59  Tol-O-Matic thus moved beyond
the narrow "extrinsic evidence" exception and, instead, implicitly
endorsed the view that claim construction is a mixed legal and factual
inquiry. Thus, over a decade after SSIH and McGill, the degree of
deference owed to claim construction remained an unsettled question
in the Federal Circuit.
53. 736 F.2d 666 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
54. Id. at 671-72.
55. Id. at 672. These jury determinations were not reviewable de novo. See Bio-Rad
Labs., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 614 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that the
Federal Circuit should defer to the jury's claim constructions unless "reasonable jurors
could [not] have interpreted the claim in the manner presumed").
56. See Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 821-22.
57. See, e.g., Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that
when the meaning of a term is disputed and extrinsic evidence is required to determine its
meaning, an underlying factual question arises, and interpretation of that claim should be
submitted to the jury), overruled by Markman 1, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
58. 945 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
59. Id. at 1549-50.
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B. The Markman Cases
1. Markman I: Is Claim Construction a Question of Law or Fact?
In 1995, in Markman I, the Federal Circuit attempted to settle
the confusion regarding the nature of claim construction.6" Sitting en
banc, the Federal Circuit held that claim construction is a pure legal
inquiry with no underlying factual issues.6' Consequently, jury input
is never necessary in claim construction,62 and claim construction is
reviewable de novo on appeal.63 Markman I promised to bring early
certainty to patent litigation and promote settlement of cases by
facilitating pretrial claim construction in specialized Markman
hearings. The ruling also promised improved accuracy by allowing
for unfettered expert review by the Federal Circuit.'
Markman I had its origins in a dispute over a drycleaning
inventory control system patent.6  The novel feature of plaintiff
Markman's drycleaning system was its ability to monitor "inventory"
throughout the cleaning process and generate reports about an item's
location and status.66 Westview developed a drycleaning system that
recorded an inventory of receivables, but did not track and record the
locations of the actual items of clothing.67 Markman sued Westview
for patent infringement.6 8 At trial, the jury rendered a verdict for
Markman.69 Westview moved for judgment as a matter of law,
arguing that the term "inventory" in the claims in Markman's patent
encompassed both cash receipts and articles of clothing.70 Since its
product did not track items of clothing, Westview argued, the jury
clearly erred in finding infringement.7' The trial judge agreed and
granted Westview's motion.72
The Federal Circuit, in affirming the trial court's ruling, held that
the construction of patent claims is a clear question of law to be
decided exclusively by the judge and expressly disavowed all contrary
60. See Markman 1, 52 F.3d 967, 976-79 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), affd, 517 U.S. 370
(1996).
61. Id. at 979.
62. Id. at 976-77.
63. Id.
64. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
65. Markman 1I, 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 375.
68. See id. at 374-75.
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authority.73 The Federal Circuit based its decision on three doctrinal
considerations. First, the Federal Circuit reasoned that claim
construction is a question of law because "the construction of written
evidence is exclusively within the court."74 Furthermore, because a
patent is a "fully-integrated written instrument,"75 it requires no
extrinsic factual supplementation and is "uniquely suited for having
its meaning and scope determined entirely by a court."76 Finally, the
Federal Circuit noted that a patent is a governmental grant of rights
to the patentee; claim construction, therefore, is merely an
explanation of legal rights granted in the patent.77
The Federal Circuit quickly dismissed the possibility that claim
construction, although essentially a legal matter, might involve
substantial factual findings.78 While acknowledging that judges
frequently consult extrinsic evidence and even expert witnesses for
assistance in interpreting claims,79 the Federal Circuit held that these
activities did not constitute "fact finding."8 The court, in a distinction
that continues to escape many,81 dismissed the possibility that claim
construction might require "making factual evidentiary findings." 8
Rather, the court simply took note of extrinsic evidence that it
"[found] helpful" to "assist" in the claim construction process.83
As a matter of policy, the Federal Circuit reasoned that judges,
and not juries, should construe claims so as to lend stability and
predictability to the patent system.' Allowing judges, who are
trained in the law and experienced in document interpretation, to
interpret patent claims would eliminate many of the inconsistencies
that result from putting complex technical issues before the jury. 5
73. Markman 1, 52 F.3d 967, 976-77 (Fed.Cir. 1995) (en banc), affd, 517 U.S. 370
(1996).





79. Id. at 980.
80. Id. at 981.
81. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Johnson, Was Markman Wrong in Tasking Judges with Claim
Construction? The Promises and the Reality, (PLI Order No. 3027, July 2004), available at
http://www.ssd.com/files/tbl s29Publications/FileUpload5689/9076/ArtMarkman82004.pd
f (questioning Markman's analysis); see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d
1448, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting) ("As a matter of logic, this
instruction is difficult to grasp.").
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The court's holding that claim construction should not go to the jury
seemed to comport with Congress's mandate that the Federal Circuit
take affirmative steps to lend stability to patent law.86 Having
established that claim construction is a question of law, the Federal
Circuit went on to hold that claim construction is reviewable de
novo.
87
2. Markman II: Is There a Seventh Amendment Right to Trial by
Jury in Claim Construction?
Markman appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari on the narrow question of whether the Seventh
Amendment requires claim construction to be tried by a jury.88 The
Seventh Amendment does not actually create a right to trial by jury,
but rather preserves any jury rights that already existed under English
common law when the Seventh Amendment was adopted in 1791.89
A historical analysis of the English common law is, therefore, the
touchstone of all Seventh Amendment jury claims.90 Justice Souter,
86. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also
H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20 (1981) ("The new Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit will
provide nationwide uniformity in patent law, will make the rules applied in patent
litigation more predictable and will eliminate the expensive, time-consuming and
unseemly forum-shopping that characterizes litigation in the field."); Dreyfuss, supra note
42, at 6-7 (describing the creation of the Federal Circuit); Summer, supra note 48, at 1131-
34 (same).
87. Markman I, 52 F.3d at 979. The majority's decision in Markman I inspired several
spirited dissenting and concurring opinions. Judge Mayer, for example denounced the
majority opinion as the "bizarre" result of "insular dogmatism inspired by unwarranted
elitism." Id. at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring). Judge Mayer predicted that the majority's
"revisionist reading of precedent to loose claim interpretation from its factual
foundations" would have "profoundly negative consequences." Id. at 990. Judge Mayer
denounced what he viewed as the majority's attempt to create a " 'complexity exception'
to the Seventh Amendment." Id. at 993.
88. Markman 11, 515 U.S. 1192, 1192 (1995). Markman argued that the trial court's
grant of judgment as a matter of law rendered the jury's claim construction a nullity and
thereby violated his Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. Markman is regarded not
only as one of the seminal decisions in the field of patent law but also as the leading
opinion governing the roles of judge and jury under the Seventh Amendment. See Paul F.
Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact Under the Seventh Amendment,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1136 (2003).
89. Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) ("The right of
trial by jury thus preserved is the right which existed under the English common law when
the Amendment was adopted.").
90. See Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving
Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 187-92 (2000)
(discussing the evolution of the historical test for determining when the Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury applies).
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writing for a unanimous Court, utilized a two-step analysis.91 In the
first step, the Court asked "whether [the claim is] dealing with a cause
of action that either was tried at law at the time of the founding or is
at least analogous to one that was." g Then, if the action was tried at
law, the Court asked "whether the particular trial decision must fall to
the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right
as it existed in 1791." 93 On the first issue, the Court needed only two
sentences to conclude that because patent infringement actions were
tried to a jury in 1791, the Seventh Amendment clearly preserved the
general right to trial by jury in patent actions. 94
The Court then turned to the more troubling second question-
whether jury input in the claim construction process is necessary "in
order to preserve the substance of the ... right."95  Almost
immediately the Court found that a direct historical analysis could not
provide a definitive answer. 96 Patent claims were not recognized by
statute until 1836 and were not a formal requirement until 1870. 9'
The Court was, therefore, forced to examine the issue by way of
analogy.98 The Court noted that "[t]he closest 18th-century analogue
of modern claim construction seems ... to have been the construction
of [the] specifications." 99 The "smattering"'" of 18th-century patent
cases available "established [no] jury practice sufficient to support an
argument by analogy that today's construction of a claim should be a
guaranteed jury issue."'1°
91. This two-step analysis was first introduced in Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,
417-18 (1958). See Kirgis, supra note 88, at 1137.
92. Markman 11, 517 U.S. at 376.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 377 ("[T]here is no dispute that infringement cases today must be tried to a
jury, as their predecessors were more than two centuries ago."); see Kirgis, supra note 88,
at 1137.
95. Markman H, 517 U.S. at 376.
96. Kirgis, supra note 88, at 1137.
97. See Nichole Biglin, Enablement: For the Judge or the Jury? Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc.'s Analysis Applied, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 145,154 (2003-2004).
98. Markman 11, 517 U.S. at 378-79; Biglin, supra note 97, at 154.
99. Markman 1H, 517 U.S. at 379. Prior to the requirement that a patent contain
distinct claims, the scope of patent protection was determined by the court's interpretation
of the description of the invention in the specification section. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 380. One historian cited by the Markman II Court observed that judges of
the late eighteenth century consistently kept the " 'writings out of the jury's hands and
reserve[d] it for themselves' " as a " 'safeguard' " against the possibility that the jury might
" 'constru[e] or refin[e] it at pleasure.'" Id. at 382 n.7 (quoting 9 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2461 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed.
1981)).
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Having determined that the historical analysis did not support
the right to a jury trial on claim construction, the Court agreed to
"look elsewhere" for evidence that claim construction should go to
the jury.102  The Court examined several "functional
considerations, '"13 noting that "when an issue 'falls somewhere
between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact-
law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a
matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is
better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.' "I'
Citing the "highly technical"1"5 nature of patents, and noting that
"[t]he construction of written instruments is one of those things that
judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by
training in exegesis,"106 the Court found that "judges, not juries are
the better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent terms."107
While acknowledging that claim construction is a "mongrel
practice"108 -"fall[ing] somewhere between a pristine legal standard
and a simple historical fact"'"-the Court held "the construction of a
patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the
province of the court.'
10
C. The Post-Markman Era: The Nature of Claim Construction
Remains Unsettled
Following the Markman decisions, district courts instituted
several procedural changes to effectuate the promise of Markman-
102. Id. at 384.
103. Some observers have argued that these policy determinations and not the actual
historical analysis were the driving forces behind the Court's decision. See, e.g., Cybor
Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Mayer, J.,
concurring) ("[The Supreme Court] decided as a matter of policy that judges, not juries,
are better able to perform this task [claim construction] given the complexity of evidence
and documentation. This was a perilous decision of last resort.").
104. Markman II, 517 U.S. at 388 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
105. Id. at 389.
106. Id. at 388.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 378.
109. Id. at 388 (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 114). The Court was not persuaded by
Markman's argument that when a judge uses extrinsic evidence, in particular expert
witness testimony, she will be making credibility determinations that should be submitted
to the jury. Id. at 389. Justice Souter rightfully admitted that credibility determinations
may be made during claim construction. Id. Nevertheless, he contended that a judge must
still construe the claims as a matter of law because "any credibility determinations will be
subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document." Id.; see
Frank M. Gasparo, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. and Its Procedural Shock
Wave: The Markman Hearing, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 723,738-39 (1996).
110. Markman 11, 517 U.S. at 372.
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expedited claim construction.'' Foremost among these was the
implementation of pretrial Markman hearings specifically conducted
for the purpose of claim construction."2 In these Markman hearings,
the parties present arguments and evidence supporting their version
of the claims."3  These pretrial hearings promise to promote
efficiency in patent law by providing the parties with the all-important
claim construction determination early in the litigation process.14
The Markman hearing quickly became a common feature in patent
litigation." 5
Markman I and I did, however, leave many unanswered
questions. Foremost among these concerns was the propriety of de
novo review. Because the Supreme Court's decision resolved only
the narrow issue of whether the Seventh Amendment requires that
the claim construction is to be decided by a jury, the ensuing two
years were marked by fierce disagreement among the judges of the
Federal Circuit as to whether deference is ever due, under Rule
52(a), 116 to the "factual underpinnings"'17 of the district courts' claim
constructions." 8 Despite the Federal Circuit's holding in Markman I
that claim construction is reviewable de novo, several of the Federal
Circuit judges seized on the Supreme Court's description in Markman
1I of claim construction as a "mongrel practice" 119 and continued to
grant deference to the allegedly factual underpinnings of claim
construction. 2 ° Other Federal Circuit judges, following Markman I,
111. See generally Gasparo, supra note 109 (discussing the implementation of the first
Markman hearing).
112. Id. at 725.
113. Id. at 756.
114. Id. at 725-26.
115. Michael A. O'Shae, A Changing Role for the Markman Hearing: In Light of Festo
IX, Markman Hearings Could Become M-F-G Hearings Which Are Longer, More
Complex and Ripe for Appeal, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 843, 843 (2004); see Cybor Corp. v.
FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Newman J., concurring)
("[S]o-called 'Markman hearings' are common .... ).
116. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires inter alia that "[flindings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of
the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
117. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455.
118. Burgess, supra note 10, at 772-73.
119. Markman H, 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996).
120. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547,
1555-56 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing the trial court's superior ability to evaluate expert witness
testimony as a reason to uphold its claim construction); Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d
1578, 1586 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Mayer, J., concurring) ("[W]here material facts are disputed,
claim construction requires resolution of both questions of fact and questions of law, and
this court may be required to give due deference to the trial court's factual findings.");
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strictly applied the de novo standard.12' Thus, nearly fifteen years
after SSIH and McGill, and despite Markman I and H, the nature of
claim construction was still unsettled in the Federal Circuit.
D. Cybor v. FAS Technologies
1. Reaffirming De Novo Review
In 1998, the Federal Circuit again tried to resolve the
controversy. Sitting en banc in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies,
Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed that "as a purely legal question ...
claim construction [is reviewable] de novo on appeal including any
allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim construction" and
expressly disavowed all contrary authority. 122 Cybor thus simplified
the appellate process by establishing a bright-line rule making all
aspects of claim construction reviewable de novo 23
In Cybor, the manufacturer of a pump used to apply fluids in
small, precise volumes onto semiconductor wafers sued the patentee
for declaratory relief.124 After the jury found willful infringement, the
judge denied plaintiff's judgment as a matter of law motion, which
sought to limit the scope of the claims 125 based on statements made to
the examiner during prosecution.'26 After Markman I was decided,
the plaintiff moved unsuccessfully for reconsideration in light of that
Wiener v. NEC Elecs., Inc., 102 F.3d 534, 539 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Markman 11 for the
proposition that claim construction "falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard
and a simple historical fact"); Metaullics Sys. Co. v. Cooper, 100 F.3d 938, 939 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (citing Markman II for the proposition that "because claim construction is a mixed
question of law and fact, ... we may be required to defer to a trial court's factual
findings"). For an in-depth discussion of the divergent opinions of the Federal Circuit
judges pre-Cybor but post-Markman on the appellate standard of review, see Donald
Dunner & Howard Kwon, Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies: The Final Say on Appellate
Review of Claim Construction, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 481,482-89 (1998).
121. See, e.g., Serrano, 111 F.3d at 1582; Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102
F.3d 1214, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d
1098, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Gen. Am. Transp. Corp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d 766, 769
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
122. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1456 ("Accordingly, we today disavow any language in
previous opinions of this court that ... suggests anything to the contrary.").
123. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
124. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1448.
125. Id. at 1453. The patent claims were written in "means-plus-function" format. Id
at 1456. For a general discussion of means-plus-function claims, see PRINCIPLES OF
PATENT LAW, supra note 42, at 947-50.
126. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1453. Patent prosecution is "the process of applying for a
patent through the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and negotiating with the patent
examiner." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1258 (8th ed. 2004).
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decision. 27 A Federal Circuit panel heard oral arguments on appeal
and then sua sponte ordered that the case be heard en banc.'2 8
Though deeply divided, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
continuing validity of its ruling in Markman I that claim construction,
as purely a legal issue, is reviewable de novo.129 The Cybor majority
began by reasserting Markman It's holding that "the totality of claim
construction is a legal question to be decided by the judge."'3 ° In
holding claim construction to be a purely legal question, the Federal
Circuit stated that the Supreme Court thereby rejected, or never
endorsed, a "silent, third option-that claim'construction may involve
subsidiary or underlying questions of fact." '3
Additionally, the Cybor majority emphasized that its mandate to
"provide[] national uniformity [in] the construction of patent claim[s]
... would be impeded if we were bound to give deference to a trial
judge's asserted factual determinations incident to claim
construction. "132
The Cybor majority dismissed the Supreme Court's description
of claim construction as a "mongrel practice '133 "falling somewhere
between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact"'" as
merely "prefatory comments[,] demonstrating the ... determination
of whether patent claim construction is a question of law or fact is not
simple or clear cut." '135 Rather, the Cybor majority emphasized the
Supreme Court's observation that the seemingly factual
underpinnings of claim construction "will be subsumed within the
necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document."'
36
Finally, the majority noted that the Supreme Court in Markman
H had the opportunity to change the de novo appellate standard of
review announced in Markman P" Its failure to do so "le[ft]
Markman I as the controlling authority regarding our standard of
review.
' 13 8
127. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1453.
128. Markman I, 52 F.3d at 970 n.1.
129. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1456.
130. Id. at 1455 (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1455.
133. Id. (citing Markman II, 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996)).
134. Id. (citing Markman H, 517 U.S. at 388).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1456 (citing Markman 11, 517 U.S. at 389) (commenting on the insignificance
of "credibility determinations" when evaluating expert witness testimony).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1456.
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2. The Rader Dissent: A Voice of Warning
The Federal Circuit was, however, sharply divided. Paramount
in criticism was Judge Rader. His oft-cited dissenting opinion
accurately foreshadowed many of the difficulties that would result
from the application of de novo review. Judge Rader argued that the
Federal Circuit's insistence that it be "[u]nencumbered by the trial
process" 13 9 would destroy Markman I's promise of promoting early
certainty and greater efficiency in patent litigation through pretrial
claim interpretation in Markman hearings.4 ' Judge Rader observed:
Markman I potentially promised to supply early certainty about
the meaning of a patent claim. This certainty, in turn, would
prompt early settlement of many, if not most, patent suits.
Once the parties know the meaning of the claims, they can
predict with some reliability the likelihood of a favorable
judgment, factor in the economics of the infringement, and
arrive at a settlement to save the costs of litigation. Markman I
promised to provide this benefit early in the trial court process.
To provide fairness under the Markman I regime, trial judges
would provide claim interpretations before the expense of trial.
Patent practitioners would then be armed with knowledge of
the probable outcome of the litigation and could facilitate
settlement.
141
De novo review, according to Judge Rader, would destroy any
early certainty promised under Markman 1.142 Under Cybor, the trial
court's pretrial claim construction, which was expected to bring early
resolution to most cases,
provides no early certainty at all, but only opens the
bidding.... To get a certain claim interpretation, parties must
go past the district court's Markman[] proceeding, past the
entirety of discovery, past the entire trial on its merits, past post
trial motions, past briefing and argument to the Federal
Circuit-indeed past every step in the entire course of federal
litigation, except Supreme Court review.43
139. Id. at 1473 (Rader, J., dissenting).
140. See id. at 1473-75.
141. Id. 1475-76.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1476.
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Thus, rather than promote efficiency, Judge Rader argued that de
novo review has the "perverse effect[]""' of making the trial court a
mere "tryout on the road"'4 a  to the real "main event "146-appeal
before the Federal Circuit. 47
As evidence, Judge Rader offered the Federal Circuit's own
statistics. During the approximately two years between Markman I
and Cybor, when the majority of the Federal Circuit judges were
applying de novo review, the Federal Circuit reversed "53% of the
cases from the district courts" in whole or in part and "almost 40% of
claim constructions."'48 Judge Rader further observed: "A reversal
rate in this range reverses more than the work of numerous trial
courts; it also reverses the benefits of Markman I. In fact, this
reversal rate, hovering near 50% is the worst possible. Even a rate
that was much higher would provide greater certainty."' 49
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1478 (citing Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)).
146. Id.
147. It is possible that in some cases the Federal Circuit's high reversal rate might
actually encourage risk-averse litigants to settle rather than endure unpredictable and
expensive patent litigation. However, in most cases, uncertainty actually fosters litigation.
Because litigants typically overestimate their chances of prevailing, legal uncertainty
discourages settlement. Id. at 1475-76. Judge Rader explained:
Three variables affect the settlement calculus of each party to litigation: p, the
probability of the plaintiff obtaining damages; J, the expected value of a judgment
for the plaintiff; and c, the cost of litigation .... The plaintiff values the case at
pJ - c. If the defendant agrees on the values assigned to the variables, the suit will
cost him pJ + c. This rough model poses an interesting question. Because the
costs of litigation invariably exceed the costs of settlement, why do not all cases
settle? Chief Judge Posner answers: "[U]ncertainty as to outcome is the key to
the settlement rate .... " This uncertainty leads each party to overestimate its
chance of prevailing. Accordingly, each party will assign different values to the
variables, most notably p, thereby diminishing the likelihood of settlement.
Id. at 1475 n.3 (citations omitted).
148. Id at 1476. Concerning the Federal Circuit's astonishingly high reversal rate,
Judge Kathleen M. O'Malley of the Northern District of Ohio has made the following
comments:
Over the last year, the reversal rate [by the Federal Circuit] has been fifty-eight
percent. More conservative numbers from other analyses put the reversal rate at
about forty-seven percent. The average reversal rate in other circuits is about
seventeen to twenty percent, depending on what circuit you are in. I have jokingly
said that perhaps litigants should want to be on the losing side at the district court
level because there appears to be a presumption at the Federal Circuit that the
district judges generally get claim construction wrong.
A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 680 (2004) [hereinafter A Panel Discussion].
149. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1476.
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Judge Rader argued
[t]rial attorneys must devote much of their trial strategy to
positioning themselves for the 'endgame'-claim construction
on appeal. As the focus shifts from litigating for the correct
claim construction to preserving ways to compel reversal on
appeal, the uncertainty, cost and duration of patent litigation
only increase. Thus, the en banc court's de novo regime belies
the purpose and promise of Markman 1.15°
III. SHOULD WE ABANDON DE Novo REVIEW?
A. Undermining the Promise of Markman: The De Novo Quagmire
Despite the vehemence of the dissents in Markman I and Cybor,
the elimination of the jury from the issue of claim interpretation was
generally regarded as a positive development by the patent bar. 5'
Many commentators and judges noted that Markman and Cybor
promised to usher a new era of simplicity and predictability into
patent law."52 "No longer would the district courts have to separate
issues of law and fact in claim construction, and by securing de novo
review the Federal Circuit would be freer to lead by example and
could ensure consistency and uniformity in claim construction by
taking the issue for itself."'53  Unfortunately, Judge Rader's
prediction that the de novo review standard would "undermine, if not
destroy the ... certainty and predictability sought by Markman I""'
largely has been realized. Rather than bringing clarity, Markman and
Cybor have added a whole new level of lawyering and cost, both in
terms of absolute dollars and delay. 5
150. Id.
151. Nard, supra note 24, at 359 n.17.
152. For example, Judge Plager heralded the Cybor majority opinion for simplifying
the appeals process. In Judge Plager's view, requiring the courts to separate the legal and
factual elements of claim construction would be unrealistically difficult and burdensome.
Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1462-63. By applying a uniform de novo review standard the Federal
Circuit and the trial courts "can focus on ... the question that counts: what do the claims
mean." Id.
153. Burgess, supra note 10, at 763.
154. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1474 (Rader, J., dissenting).
155. Cheryl L. Johnson, The False Premise and Promises of Markman's Decision to
Task Judges with Claim Construction and the Judicial Scorecard, in HOW TO PREPARE &
CONDUCT MARKMAN HEARINGS 2005, at 9, 17-18 (PLI Intellectual Property, Course
Handbook Series No. G-837, 2005) ("Markman has created a 'Catch-22 situation' in which
there is no certainty until after the Federal Circuit ruling on claim construction, even
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Several empirical studies demonstrate the accuracy of Judge
Rader's predictions. A study conducted by Christian Chu analyzed
all 502 patent decisions by the Federal Circuit between January 1,
1998 and April 30, 2000 and concluded that the reversal rate in patent
cases on all issues hovered around forty-seven percent, and dropped
to thirty-six percent if summary affirmances were included.5 6
Moreover, Chu also found a trend showing an increase in claim
construction modification and claim interpretation-based reversal
since Cybor. is7
The most recent comprehensive study available was conducted
by Kimberly Moore. Professor Moore analyzed all claim construction
appeals to the Federal Circuit from 1996 (post-Markman) through
2003. She concluded that the reversal rate for appealed claim
constructions is 40.8%, dropping to 34.5% if summary affirmances are
included.'58
As patent practitioners have shifted their focus from "litigating
the correct claim construction to preserving ways to compel reversal
on appeal, the uncertainty, cost, and duration of patent litigation [has]
only increase[d]."'59 A recent American Intellectual Property Law
Association ("AIPLA") study demonstrated that between the years
of 2001 and 2003, litigation costs for patent infringement suits
significantly increased.160 The average cost of trials where more than
one million dollars was at risk increased thirty-three percent during
that time."6 Of course, all litigation has probably become more
expensive. However, the same AIPLA study, using the same
methodology, noted that the cost of copyright and trademark
though that ruling usually comes only after the enormous expense of a full jury trial or
entry of judgment.").
156. Christian Chu, Empirical Analysis of Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends,
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1097-99 (2001).
157. Id. at 1096-05. The author of this Comment speculates that the Federal Circuit's
high reversal rate is to some extent a self-perpetuating phenomenon. The high reversal
rate creates a disincentive for trial judges to expend their time and other resources to
arrive at the proper claim construction when they know that their work will carry little
weight with the Federal Circuit on appeal. This disincentive in turn contributes to
inaccurate decisions at the trial court level, thus helping to perpetuate the Federal
Circuit's high reversal rate.
158. Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231,236, 245-47 (2005).
159. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1476 (Rader, J., dissenting).
160. AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY 2003, at 21-22 (2003).
161. Id.
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infringement litigation did not increase significantly over the same
period.162
In addition to increasing the cost and duration of patent
litigation, the Markman-Cybor regime has the unintended
consequence of demoralizing many district court judges and blurring
the functional distinction between the trial and appellate courts. 63
B. Alternatives to De Novo Review
1. Judge Mayer's Two-Tiered Approach
In light of the difficulties encountered under the Markman-
Cybor regime, many judges and commentators have advocated
curtailing de novo review in favor of some degree of deference to the
trial courts."6 These commentators differ, however, in the degree of
deference that should be afforded the trial courts. Former Federal
Circuit Chief Judge Mayer, for example, has long been a vocal critic
of the Markman-Cybor regime for transforming the Federal Circuit
into a "trial court of first and usually last resort."'65 Judge Mayer
162. Id.
163. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Mayer,
J., dissenting) ("Our [de novo review] has resulted in ... diminished respect for the
court."). Although there have not been any comprehensive, systematic surveys of district
court judges to guage attitudes about the Federal Circuit, there are abundant anecdotal
statements that illustrate this frustration. For example, Judge Patti Sairs of the District of
Massachusetts noted:
[T]o some extent, the high reversal rate demoralizes many federal district court
judges .... Trial court judges kill themselves on a [patent] trial, only to feel as
though they are just a weigh station along the way to appeal. The lawyers know
this and some of them treat us that way. Every single issue is raised; every one is
preserved. If there are fifteen claims and fifteen constructions, the odds are
favorable that the [Federal Circuit] will reverse on at least one or two.
A Panel Discussion, supra note 148, at 682. Similar sentiments were expressed by Judge
Kathleen M. O'Malley of the Northern District of Ohio: "In looking at these numbers
[the Federal Circuit reversal rates] I wondered, are we really just so bad at this? Are we
district court judges just stupid? ... Perhaps we really do not know what we are doing."
Id. Judge Samuel B. Kent of the Southern District of Texas likewise expressed frustration
at the close of a protracted patent infringement trial. "Frankly, I don't know why I'm so
excited about trying to bring this thing to closure. It goes to the Federal Circuit
afterwards. You know, it's hard to deal with things that are ultimately resolved by people
wearing propeller hats." Victoria Slind-Flor, Judges Receive Mixed Reviews on Handling
of Patent Claims, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 14,2002, at 1.
164. See, e.g., Burgess, supra note 10, at 796; see also Brief for Amicus Curiae
American Intellectual Property Law Association, supra note 20, at 18-23; Brief of Amicus
Curiae Federal Circuit Bar Association, supra note 20, at 7-9.
165. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Judge Mayer has characterized Markman 1I as a "perilous decision of last resort" which
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would return the court to a McGill-like two-tiered standard66 wherein
the Federal Circuit would review legal conclusions in claim
interpretation de novo and factual findings in claim interpretation for
clear error.167 By granting deference to the trial courts, this two-tiered
approach would help elevate the trial court from its current status of
being merely a "tryout on the road"'168 to the Federal Circuit to the
actual "main event.'
' 69
The primary difficulty with granting deference to factual findings
is that it may, if applied too strictly, sacrifice accuracy for the sake of
efficiency and finality. Is it more important to achieve early certainty
or an accurate result? If, as the Federal Circuit's reversal rate
suggests, the trial courts err in approximately forty percent of all
claim constructions, granting too much "factual" deference would
simply be to turn a blind eye to an enormous problem of inaccuracy
at the district court level. 170 If the Federal Circuit were to routinely
grant deference to these errors simply because they are factual, the
field of patent litigation might be better off simply by conducting a
claim construction coin toss at the outset of each trial. Each party
would present to the court its version of the claims and the judge
would toss a coin to determine which version would be controlling.
This practice would be only slightly less accurate and certainly much
more efficient than requiring district courts to go through a formal
"bluntly force[d] the square peg of claim construction into the round hole of... law" as a
pure matter of policy. Id. at 1464 n.1.
166. The Federal Circuit applies two-tiered review in other areas of patent law. For
example, obviousness is a question of law, which the Federal Circuit reviews de novo,
though any underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. In re Duel, 51 F.3d
1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
167. See supra note 166.
168. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1478 (Rader, J., dissenting).
169. Id.
170. Commentators have long questioned whether district court judges are equipped to
resolve patent cases. Indeed, many recommendations have been made for achieving more
accurate decisions at the trial court level. Some of these recommendations have included
implementing specialized trial courts, special judges, expert juries, and greater use of
technical advisors. See, e.g., Burgess, supra note 10, at 791 (noting various proposals of
earlier commentators to place greater expertise at the trial court level including
specialized trial courts, specialized trial court judges, and greater use of technical
advisors); Moore, supra note 24, at 39 (noting earlier proposals to place greater expertise
at the trial court level including blue ribbon juries, specialized trial courts, specialized trial
court judges, and greater use of special masters). Although these recommendations may
have merit, thus far none has taken hold. An examination of the virtues of these proposals
is beyond the scope of this Comment. Instead, this Comment focuses on less radical
measures that can ameliorate the problems encountered under the Markman-Cybor
regime without fundamentally altering trial court procedure.
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Markman hearing. 7' Although comparing district court claim
construction to a coin toss is certainly hyperbolic, it does illustrate an
obvious deficiency in a policy requiring deference to district court
error simply because it seems factual in nature.'72
In practice, granting deference to factual findings would not
require the Federal Circuit to give a blank check to the district courts.
Under a two-tiered review standard, the Federal Circuit could still
review the legal aspects of claim construction de novo. By re-
categorizing a disputed district court pronouncement as legal rather
than factual, the Federal Circuit would be free to correct most district
171. This assumes that the claim constructions of the Federal Circuit are correct.
Although an adequate treatment of the accuracy of the Federal Circuit's decisions is
beyond the scope of this Comment, other commentators have pointed to the remarkably
low rate of dissenting opinions in the Federal Circuit as evidence that the Federal Circuit
does in fact "get it right" in most cases. Professor Kimberly Moore, in her empirical
review of the Federal Circuit, noted that in the 496 claim terms appealed to the Federal
Circuit between April 23, 1996 and December 31, 2000, there were only fifteen total
dissents (six of which were written by Judge Rader). Moore, supra note 24, at 25. Hence,
the Federal Circuit judges disagreed about a claim construction in only three percent of
cases. "[S]uch decisions generally create a sense of security that the claim construction is
not a coin flip." Id. at 24.
172. Of course, in areas besides patent law, the federal appeals courts are similarly
bound to defer to the trial court's factual findings. Findings of fact can only be overturned
if they are "clearly erroneous" or constitute an abuse of discretion. See FED. R. Civ. P.
52(a) ("Findings of fact ... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous .... "). This
deference is premised on the belief that the trial court is better equipped to make factual
determinations where the credibility of the evidence must be evaluated. See, e.g., id.
("[D]ue regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the
credibility of the witnesses."). Why then is requiring deference to contentious factual
elements of claim construction more of an obvious deficiency than requiring similar
deference in other fields of law? There are at least three possible reasons. First, the
technologically complex nature of most patent claims changes the nature of the traditional
credibility determination. Because credibility determinations in claim construction tend to
be based more in objective, scientific fact, rather than the trustworthiness of individual
witnesses, the traditional evaluation of witness credibility assumes a lesser role in patent
interpretation. See, e.g., Markman 11, 517 U.S 370, 389 (1996) ("[Any credibility
determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole
[patent]."). Furthermore, because the factual findings in patent cases are based more on
objective, scientific facts and less on traditional witness trustworthiness, the appellate
court is often equally equipped, if not more so, to make factual determinations. This is
particularly true in the Federal Circuit, where the appellate judges specialize in patent law.
See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 42, at 48 ("Where ... the trial court is composed of
generalists and the appellate court is staffed to deal with the complex factual issues being
tried, [Rule 52(a)'s] assumption breaks down, for the appellate court is at least as well
situated to find the facts as the trial court."). Finally, given the degree of legal
specialization required in patent cases and the infrequency with which most district court
judges hear patent cases, some judges have themselves questioned whether they are
adequately equipped to resolve patent cases. See, e.g., A Panel Discussion, supra note 148,
at 680-83 (noting the frustration of Judges O'Malley, Saris, and Whyte with the current
state of district court patent trials).
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court errors. 7 3  While a flexible application of two-tiered review
would certainly ameliorate the problems described above, it raises
another substantial difficulty-the need to make fine distinctions
between the legal and factual aspects of claim construction. Because
claim construction is a "mongrel practice, '"174 parsing the trial court's
work into discrete legal and factual categories is not an easy task.'75
Indeed, as Judge Plager noted in his Cybor concurrence, the primary
virtue of bright-line de novo review is that it frees the trial courts
from having to make these difficult differentiations between
questions of law and questions of fact.'7 6 The bright-line de novo
standard frees the courts to "focus on ... the question that counts:
what do the claims mean?
177
Furthermore, the flexibility of the two-tiered standard has the
potential to interject even more uncertainty into patent litigation.
Because claim construction "falls somewhere between a pristine legal
standard and a simple historical fact,' 1 78 the individual judge's
predilection to characterize these mongrel questions as either legal or
factual, would greatly influence the character of the appellate
review.179 A judge who views claim construction as a primarily factual
inquiry would be philosophically bound to grant deference even when
the trial court's claim constructions seem inaccurate.180  A less
deferential judge could easily review the same trial court holding de
173. Under a two-tiered review system, it is unclear which court would characterize the
claim interpretation as legal or factual. This discussion assumes that the Federal Circuit
would determine which of the district court's pronouncements are factual and which are
legal. It is conceivable, although unlikely, considering the historically active role the
Federal Circuit has taken in claim construction, that the trial court judges would be
allowed to characterize their own pronouncements as either legal or factual. The Federal
Circuit would then be required to apply a "clearly erroneous" standard of review to all
pronouncements that the district court categorizes as factual.
174. Markman II, 517 U.S. at 378.
175. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) ("[T]he determination of whether patent claim construction is a question of law or
fact is not simple or clear cut.").
176. See id. at 1462 (Plager, J., concurring) ("[This] simply means that we do not spend
our ... time debating whether the trial court's information base constitutes findings of
'fact' or conclusions of 'law,' with verbally different standards of review.").
177. Id. at 1462-63.
178. Markman H, 517 U.S. at 388 (internal citations omitted).
179. See, e.g., Mary L. Jennings, Should Advocates Be Informed of the Identities of
Members of Judicial Panels Prior to Hearings?, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 41 (1996) (noting the
Federal Circuit's refusal to divulge which judges will hear any given case until the morning
of oral argument to avoid possible judge-shopping).
180. Once the "mongrel" question is characterized as factual it could only be reviewed
under a clearly erroneous standard. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); see, e.g., Cybor, 138 F.3d at
1456 (discussing the application of the clearly erroneous standard of review to allegedly
factual elements of claim construction).
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novo simply by characterizing any mongrel questions as legal, thereby
perpetuating the problems of Markman and Cybor. The two-tiered
regime, therefore, might foster, rather than reduce, uncertainty in
patent litigation.
2. Judge Rader's "Functional Approach"
Another alternative solution was advocated by Judge Rader in
his Cybor dissent.18' Under Judge Rader's "functional approach,"'82
the Federal Circuit would abandon its bright-line de novo standard
and instead defer to the trial court "when it appears that the district
court is 'better positioned' than the appellate court to decide the issue
in question or that probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to
the clarity of legal doctrine."'8 3 In Judge Rader's view, the trial court
is generally in a superior position to engage in claim construction.
Whereas the Federal Circuit is bound to a fixed record, the trial court
can engage in a much more rigorous and flexible analysis of the
technology. 184
Judge Rader's functional approach, however, has several
shortcomings. For example, Judge Rader's assertion that the district
courts are in a superior position to engage in claim construction has
been vehemently challenged.'85 Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss
noted that the Federal Circuit's superior expertise and experience in
patent law strained the assumption underlying Rule 52(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-that district courts are in a better
position to decide factual issues.186 The Federal Circuit is unique
amongst all federal appellate courts in that it is the sole federal
appellate court whose jurisdiction is based on subject matter rather
than geography.' Because the Federal Circuit has exclusive
181. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1473 (Rader, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 1477. Judge Rader took the phrase "functional approach" from the
language of the Supreme Court's decision in Markman I. See Markman H, 517 U.S. at
388 ("Where history and precedent provide no clear answers, functional considerations
also play their part .... ).
183. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1477 (Rader, J., dissenting) (citing Salve Regina College v.
Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 223 (1991)); see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 948 (1995) ("[T]he reviewing attitude that a court of appeals takes toward a
district court decision should depend upon the 'respective institutional advantages of trial
and appellate courts .. ' " (quoting Salve Regina, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991))).
184. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1477 (Rader, J., dissenting) ("Trial judges can spend hundreds
of hours reading and rereading all kinds of source material, receiving tutorials on
technology from leading scientists ... examining on site the operation of the ... claimed
invention.... An appellate court has none of these advantages.").
185. Burgess, supra note 10, at 766.
186. Dreyfuss, supra note 42, at 42.
187. Burgess, supra note 10, at 766.
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jurisdiction over all patent appeals, it has over the years accumulated
a depth of experience with patent matters that is simply not available
at the district level.188 Whereas the average district court judge hears
only an occasional patent case, the Federal Circuit handles
approximately one hundred patent appeals every year.189 Also, if the
trial court judges are, as Judge Rader asserts, really better positioned
to perform claim construction, why does the Federal Circuit feel
compelled to reverse the district courts in fifty-three percent of its
cases? 190 The magnitude of the reversal rate throws into serious
doubt the contention that the district court is necessarily a better
forum for claim construction than the Federal Circuit.
Additionally, Judge Rader's functional consideration approach
seems to provide little concrete guidance as to what issues are
reviewable. To apply Judge Rader's functional approach is simply to
ask whether the trial court or the Federal Circuit is better positioned
to resolve a particular question. The test provides little if any
practical guidance for determining exactly which court is better
positioned. As a practical matter, Judge Rader's test does little more
than warn the Federal Circuit not to review those issues it is not
inclined to review. Judge Mayer perhaps had these types of nebulous
legal standards in mind when he asserted that the practice of the
Federal Circuit over the past ten years has simply been to "decide
cases according to whatever mode or method results in the outcome
we desire, or at least allows us a seemingly plausible way out of the
case."191
3. De Novo Lite: The Bryson-Plager Approach
A third approach to reining in de novo review was articulated by
Judges Bryson and Plager in their separate Cybor concurrences.
Under the Bryson-Plager approach, the court would apply what might
be termed a "de novo lite" standard of review. The Federal Circuit,
188. One common misconception about the Federal Circuit is that its judges must have
technical backgrounds to be appointed to the court. At present only four of the twelve
active Federal Circuit judges have technical backgrounds. Moore, supra note 24, at 18.
The Federal Circuit judges do, however, generally hire law clerks with various technical
backgrounds. Id.
189. See id. at 8-9. Between April 23, 1996, and December 31, 2000, 323 claim
construction cases were appealed to the Federal Circuit involving 496 separate claim
construction issues. Id.
190. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (Rader, J., dissenting).
191. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Mayer, J.
dissenting).
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while exercising plenary review, would not "disregard the work done
by the district courts in claim construction .... "" Rather, "the trial
judge's view [would] carry weight ... depending on the care ... with
which that view was developed, and the information on which it [was]
based." '193 Like Judge Rader's functional review, de novo lite
recognizes that in many instances the trial court's "superior access to
... the pertinent tools of construction ' 194 (e.g., expert witness
testimony) necessitates, a "common sense"1 95 degree of deference to
the trial court's legal conclusions. Unfortunately, this standard again
provides little practical guidance. In its most basic sense, it is simply a
reminder to the appellate judge not to tamper with trial court
pronouncements she believes to be correct. De novo lite simply tips
its hat to the trial courts while continuing to perpetuate the same
problems created under the current Markman-Cybor standard. 196
C. Phillips v. AWH: A Missed Opportunity
The general dissatisfaction with the consequences of de novo
review led to intense speculation that the Federal Circuit might one
day rein in the unfettered de novo standard and restore some degree
of deference to the trial courts."9  That day came in the highly
anticipated Phillips v. AWH Corp.198 Although the central issue in
Phillips concerned what weight judges should give extrinsic evidence
(e.g., dictionaries, technical treatises) when conducting claim
construction, the Federal Circuit also asked parties to brief on the
following question: "Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
192. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring) (arguing that in many instances
the trial court's "superior access to... the pertinent tools of construction," such as expert
witness testimony, should "factor into our legal analysis").
193. Id. at 1462-63 (Plager, J., concurring) ("Whether this approach to patent litigation
will in the long run prove beneficial remains to be seen. There is every reason to believe
that it will, and certainly to believe it is better than what we had. But it may be some time
before we have enough experience with 'Markman hearings' and appellate review under
the new regime to draw any empirically sound conclusions.").
194. Id. at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 1462 (Plager, J., concurring).
196. Some trial court judges believe that de novo lite is currently the standard actually
applied by the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., A Panel Discussion, supra note 148, at 680
(comments of Judge Whyte) ("I think, and I have certainly heard a number of federal
circuit judges agree, that the [Federal Circuit] gives some deference to a well-reasoned
opinion, as a practical matter. I think that just makes common sense. The bottom line is
... [d]o whatever you want, but just get it right.").
197. See, e.g., Burgess, supra note 10, at 792-95 (arguing that the Federal Circuit should
overrule or rein in Cybor); see also supra note 20 (listing several amici curiae who argued
in favor of curtailing de novo review).
198. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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[Markman II], and our en banc decision in [Cybor], is it appropriate
for this court to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court
claim construction rulings? If so, on what aspects, in what
circumstances, and to what extent?" '199
The possibility of reining in the Markman-Cybor standard
"whipp[ed] the bar into a frenzy of expectation. ''200 Interested parties
filed over thirty amicus briefs of the issue of de novo review.21' The
Federal Circuit, however, ultimately declined, without comment, to
address the issue of de novo review.2 Instead, the Federal Circuit
resolved the issue by focusing on the question of what weight to give
dictionaries and other extrinsic evidence in the claim construction
process.203
IV. THE NEED FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
A. The Search for Pragmatic Solutions Post-Phillips
In light of the Phillips decision, it appears that de novo review of
claim construction will be the law of the Federal Circuit for the
foreseeable future.0" The focus now becomes one of finding ways of
working within the current Markman-Cybor regime to restore
efficiency and predictability to patent litigation. One noninvasive
solution would be for the Federal Circuit to begin reviewing claim
construction on an interlocutory basis.2 5  The interlocutory appeal
solution is not a novel idea. Several other commentators have
advocated interlocutory appeals in their earlier work.26 However, in
199. Id. at 1328.
200. Id. at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
201. See supra note 20 (listing amicus briefs). For a summary of the thirty amicus
briefs see Dennis Crouch, Phillips v. AWH: The Amicus Briefs, http://www.patently
obviousblog.com/2004/09/phillips_-.html (last visited Apr. 3,2006).
202. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328.
203. Id. at 1327-28.
204. Only two of the nine Federal Circuit judges, Mayer and Newman, seemed willing
to revisit the standard of review question. Id. at 1330-35 (Mayer, J., joined by Newman, J.,
dissenting).
205. Judge Mayer, in his Phillips dissent, sarcastically advocated a system of expedited
review under which
all patent cases could be filed in this court; we would determine whether claim
construction is necessary, and, if so, the meaning of the claims. Those few cases in
which claim construction is not dispositive can be remanded to the district court
for trial. In this way we would at least eliminate the time and expense of the
charade currently played out before the district court.
Id. at 1334.
206. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 24; Nard, supra note 24.
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light of the Phillips court's unwillingness to restore any degree of
deference to trial court claim constructions, interlocutory appeals
should be reconsidered as a realistic means of promoting stability in
patent law.
Interlocutory review of claim construction is a practical solution
because it retains the positive attributes of de novo review
(unfettered expert review and expedited, pre-trial claim
construction) 27 while mitigating its detrimental effects (inefficiency
and trivialized trial court proceedings). 2°8 De novo review, by placing
the final resolution of claim construction in the hands of an expert
tribunal (the Federal Circuit), has improved the accuracy of claim
construction.2 9 It has also simplified the appellate process by freeing
the court from having to make difficult distinctions between law and
fact.210 This increased accuracy and simplicity has, however, come at
a high price. By delaying final resolution of the claims until well after
the trial, de novo review has had the unintended consequence of
increasing litigation costs, delaying settlement, and trivializing the
trial court proceedings. u
Interlocutory patent appeals are a desirable post-Phillips
solution because they preserve the benefits of de novo review while
mitigating many of its detrimental effects. Interlocutory claim
interpretation appeals would spare the litigants and the courts the
burden of an expensive district court audition and retrial without
turning a blind eye to the errors of the district court. The mechanism
for this expedited review is already in place. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), the district courts can certify legal questions (including,
presumably, claim construction) for interlocutory appeal if the issue
"involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and if an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation .... "212 Although claim construction seems particularly
amenable to the requirements of § 1292(b), the Federal Circuit has
thus far exercised its discretion and refused all such interlocutory
claim construction appeals. 13
207. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
208. See supra Part III.A.
209. See supra text accompanying note 153.
210. See supra text accompanying note 176.
211. See supra Part III.A.
212. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000).
213. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (Newman, J., additional views) (noting that the Federal Circuit has refused all
interlocutory claim construction appeals).
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B. Arguments Against Interlocutory Appeals Evaluated
1. Can Claim Construction Be Reviewed Without a Trial Record?
Given the importance of early certainty and uniformity in patent
law, the Federal Circuit's reluctance to grant interlocutory appeals is
curious.214 Perhaps this reluctance simply reflects the fact that
interlocutory appeals pursuant to § 1292(b) are rarely granted.215
However, given the advantages of interlocutory appeal, and the
Federal Circuit's wholesale refusal to entertain them, a more
satisfying explanation is required. One possible explanation is that
the Federal Circuit judges do not want to review the claim
construction without the benefit of the entire trial record.216
Interlocutory review of claim construction would arguably be more
difficult than post-trial review because the court would have access
only to the limited record of the Markman hearing. Judge Newman
noted in Cybor:
Although the district courts have extended themselves, and so
called "Markman hearings" are common, this has not been
accompanied by interlocutory review of the trial judge's claim
interpretation. The Federal Circuit has thus far declined all
such certified questions. Indeed, the certified question issue
was an early warning of the difficulties that could flow from
premature claim interpretation, for it was often apparent from
the petition that the claims could not be finally and correctly
interpreted without evidence beyond the patent documents.
The absence of extrinsic evidence, of resolution of conflicting
positions, and of detailed analysis and findings by the trial judge
inhibited claim interpretation by certified question. Thus,
instead of conducting the expedited dispositive de novo review,
we simply declined the question.
217
214. Nard, supra note 24, at 372.
215. Id. ("This reluctance may simply reflect the more general fact that interlocutory
appeals pursuant to § 1292(b) are rarely granted."); see also Howard B. Eisenberg & Alan
B. Morrison, Discretionary Appellate Review of Non-Final Orders: It's Time to Change the
Rules, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCEss 285, 292 (1999) ("[C]ourts of appeals decline to hear
approximately two-thirds of the cases certified by district courts for interlocutory
appeal.").
216. See, e.g., A Panel Discussion, supra note 148, at 686 (comments of Judge Whyte)
(observing that the Federal Circuit refuses to take interlocutory appeals because they want
to "wait and see the whole picture").
217. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1479 (Newman, J., additional views).
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However, the logical inconsistency of this concern is clear. If
claim construction is, as the Federal Circuit asserts, a purely legal
question with no underlying factual inquiries, then the factual
development of the trial record should not be necessary to review the
claims. The Federal Circuit should in theory be able to evaluate a
"fully integrated"2"8 patent without even so much as the Markman
hearing record, much less a completely developed trial court record.
Inconsistencies aside, in those cases where the Federal Circuit feels
that the Markman record is insufficiently developed to allow for
appellate review, the Federal Circuit could simply remand the issue to
the trial court for additional "lawfinding.
' 219
2. Does the Federal Circuit Have the Resources to
Accommodate Interlocutory Appeals?
A more plausible explanation for the Federal Circuit's reluctance
to take interlocutory appeals might be that such appeals would
dramatically increase the court's workload.22 ° Indeed, the potential
increase in the Federal Circuit's workload is routinely cited by
commentators as the primary difficulty with interlocutory appeals.221
"The Federal Circuit judges may fear that if claim construction were
appealable on an interlocutory basis, many parties who settle rather
than endure expensive and time-consuming litigation would appeal
claim construction prior to settlement because a Federal Circuit




Professor Kimberly Moore, in her empirical study of the Federal
Circuit, hypothesized that the number of patent cases appealed would
increase by about forty-two percent if interlocutory appeals were
218. Markman I, 52 F.3d 967,978 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
219. "Lawfinding" remands are not unprecedented. In at least two instances the
Federal Circuit has remanded a case for additional development of the trial record. See
Burgess, supra note 10, at 784-86 (discussing Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc., 287 F.3d
1062 (Fed. Cir. 2000) and NeoMagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems, Inc., 325 F.3d 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2003)).
220. See Moore, supra note 24, at 34.
221. See id. at 37 ("Permitting interlocutory appeal of all claim construction issues
would overburden the Federal Circuit."); see also Nard, supra note 24, at 376 ("I am not
suggesting that the Federal Circuit's caseload will not increase [with interlocutory
appeals]."); John B. Pegram, Markman and Its Implications, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SoC'Y, 560, 568 (1996) (noting that interlocutory appeals will create a disincentive to
settle, thereby increasing the Federal Circuit's workload); Michael E. Solimine,
Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1165,
1193 (1990) ("Much of the blame is attributable to... the fear that relaxing the use of the
statute will open the floodgates to appeals.").
222. Moore, supra note 24, at 34-35.
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accepted.223 Reviewing all of these appeals, either as of right or on a
discretionary basis, would be a substantial burden on the Federal
Circuit.224
While interlocutory review would require a greater allocation of
resources to the Federal Circuit, this investment would be largely
offset by savings at the district court level. Additionally, under the
current Markman-Cybor regime, the losing party on claim
interpretation typically appeals after the final judgment anyway,225
after the district court and party resources have been expended.226 In
the absence of interlocutory appeals, "district courts have had to
conduct unnecessary trials and sometimes have had to conduct a
second trial after the claim is interpreted on appeal after final
judgment. '' 227 By investing sufficient resources at the appellate level
to allow for interlocutory appeals, the judiciary could avoid wasting
"judicial resources [on] litigation proceeding under improper claim
construction. '228  The potential increased efficiency at the district
223. Moore, supra note 24, at 36 (determined by analyzing settlement rates at various
points in the litigation process).
224. Even if the number of appeals increased by 42.5%, this increase would not
necessarily translate into a 42.5% increase in workload. Patent cases currently represent
only about twenty percent of the cases in the Federal Circuit's docket. Moore, supra note
24, at 34 (citing John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization
in Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 765, 771 (2000)).
Furthermore, because interlocutory appeals would be "limited to claim construction
issues, based upon a limited record, [they] are not likely to be as complex or time-
consuming for the court as standard post-trial patent appeals in which the gamut of
appealable issues are raised." Id. at 36. Even so, the likely increase in Federal Circuit
workload is cause for concern. See id.
225. See Moore, supra note 24, at 10 (citing Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendant's Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 125, 130-34 (2001)) (noting that the low transaction costs of appeals contribute to
"Hail Mary" appeals).
226. Nard, supra note 24, at 375.
227. Constance S. Huttner et al., Markman Practice, Procedures and Tactics, in
PATENT LITIGATION 1998, at 558 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop.,
Course Handbook Series No. 531, 1998). Some practitioners fear that the Federal
Circuit's high reversal rate prompts judges to grant summary judgment when they
otherwise would not do so. "The judge will grant summary judgment on the theory that, 'I
do not want to try this case twice, just send it up. Let the Federal Circuit tell me whether I
got the claim construction wrong by making the infringement decision on the summary
judgment.' " A Panel Discussion, supra note 148, at 687 (comments of Judge O'Malley).
228. Gasparo, supra note 109, at 766. But see A Panel Discussion, supra note 148, at
685-86 (comments of Judge Whyte) ("Interlocutory appeals are generally a mistake; they
add another layer to the litigation. Yes, maybe there is a unique case where it would be
worth doing, but despite the ... high percentage of reversals on claim construction I am
not sure overall [interlocutory appeals] would be efficient .... Patent cases tend to be
slow enough as they are .... Interlocutory appeals probably would slow down the process
and make it more expensive. It might be that in some cases you could avoid trying the
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court level justifies a relatively small investment in the appellate
system.229
C. How Interlocutory Appeals Could Be Implemented
Interlocutory appeals of Markman hearings could be achieved in
at least three ways. The least invasive simply would be for the
Federal Circuit of its own accord to begin taking interlocutory
appeals pursuant to § 1292(b)2 °-an unlikely scenario considering the
Federal Circuit's history of denying interlocutory appeals.231
Alternatively, Professor Craig Allen Nard advocates a solution
wherein the Supreme Court could, pursuant to the Rules Enabling
Act,232 promulgate a rule making claim construction appealable either
as of right or as a matter of discretion.233  As a practical matter,
promulgating a rule specifically making claim construction the subject
of discretionary review would not be substantially different than the
current § 1292(b) system. 234 The Federal Circuit could, as it has done
under the current system, uniformly refuse all interlocutory appeals.
But while a discretionary rule seems like an ineffective response to
the problem, a certain psychology exists to judging.235 The specificity
case twice, but the benefits of not [hearing interlocutory appeals] outweigh the
detriments.").
229. "If the Federal Circuit grants an interlocutory appeal, the losing party, after the
district court's final judgment, will be precluded ... from appealing the Federal Circuit's
interlocutory decision." Nard, supra note 24, at 375.
230. This system would require the district court judge to first certify the question.
Given the general sense of frustration among trial court judges with the reversal rate at
the Federal Circuit, this preliminary requirement should not be a significant obstacle. Cf
A Panel Discussion, supra note 148, at 678-85 (expressing frustration with the current
state of patent affairs). But see A Panel Discussion, supra note 148, at 685-86 (comments
of Judge White) (arguing against interlocutory appeals); Pegram, supra note 221, at 568
(noting that it is very unlikely that a trial judge will admit that "there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion" on a claim construction that he or she believes to be correct).
231. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (noting that the Federal Circuit has
never taken an interlocutory appeal of a claim construction).
232. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (2000).
233. Nard, supra note 24, at 377.
234. Professor Nard envisions the following discretionary rule:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may in its discretion
permit an appeal from a Markman order of a district court interpreting patent
claim language, if application is made within ten days after entry of the order. An
appeal does not stay the proceedings in the district court unless the district court
or Federal Circuit orders otherwise.
Id. at 378-79. The only concrete difference between this rule and the current § 1292(b)
system is that the complaining party could request review without the trial court judge first
certifying the question. See id.
235. See id. at 379.
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of a new rule, as opposed to the general language of § 1292(b), would
exert positive pressure on the Federal Circuit that does not exist
under § 1292(b).236 Such positive pressure could tip the balance in
favor of interlocutory review.
The most aggressive method to facilitate interlocutory appeals of
Markman hearings would be for the Supreme Court to promulgate a
rule making claim construction subject to interlocutory appeal as a
matter of right. Although this approach would certainly effectuate
the desired interlocutory reviews, it seems unrealistically heavy-
handed to completely strip the Federal Circuit of its discretion.237 The
change would require judges, who sit on the various rulemaking
committees, to limit or remove the discretion enjoyed by fellow
judges.238 Such compulsion seems unlikely.
The most likely solution is a specific rule making claim
construction the subject of discretionary review. Although the effect
of a discretionary claim construction rule would be merely
psychological, it is a reasonable first step in restoring some degree of
efficiency to what is increasingly becoming a chaotic system of patent
litigation.
CONCLUSION
Although the current Markman-Cybor regime has improved the
accuracy of claim construction, this accuracy has come at the cost of
efficiency and predictability in patent litigation. Under the current
regime, the Federal Circuit reviews all claim constructions de novo,
but only after the full expense of a district court trial. Given the
Federal Circuit's high reversal rate, parties have little incentive to
settle prior to appellate review. The result has been an inefficient
system where the trial court is relegated to being little more than an
audition on the road to the Federal Circuit. Given the Federal
Circuit's decision in Phillips not to reconsider the de novo standard, it
is necessary to find alternative ways to restore order to patent
litigation. One solution would be for the Federal Circuit to begin
reviewing claim construction on an interlocutory basis. This would
best be accomplished by propagating a procedural rule specifically
making claim construction the subject of discretionary interlocutory
review. By expediting the most important part of the litigation-the
236. See id.
237. Even under a compulsory system, the Federal Circuit would presumably retain its
right to grant summary affirmance to the trial court's pronouncements.
238. Nard, supra note 24, at 378.
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definitive resolution of the claim's meaning-interlocutory appeals
could preserve the benefits of de novo review while mitigating the
current waste and inefficiency in the system.
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